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ABSTRACT
This paper explores connections between affect studies and 
critical disability studies. Our interest in affect is sparked 
by the beginnings of a new research project that seeks to 
illuminate the lives, hopes and desires of young people 
with ‘life-limiting’ or ‘life-threatening’ impairments. Cultural 
responses to these young people are shaped by dominant 
discourses associated with lives lived well and long. Before 
commencing our empirical work with young people we use 
this paper to think through how we might conceptualise 
affect and disability. We present three themes; ontological 
invalidation in neoliberal-able times; affect aliens and crip 
killjoys; disability and resistant assemblages.
Points of interest
•  This article is sparked by the beginnings of a research project working with 
young people with ‘life-limiting’ or ‘life-threatening’ impairments (LL/LTIs).
•  Too often, society treats people with LL/LTIs as tragedy cases requiring pity 
and sadness.
•  People often respond to disability in deeply emotional ways.
•  There has been a lot of research recently on emotions which is broadly 
termed affect theory but disability is often ignored.
•  We seek to connect affect theory and disability research with reference to 
young people with LL/LTIs in ways that can capture the desires, hopes and 
ambitions of these young people, their families and allies.
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198   D. GOODLEY ET AL.
1. Introduction
This article explores the original offerings of affect theory to studies of disability 
and, as a way of exchange, the unique contribution of critical disability studies 
to theories of affect. Our interest in the latter has been elevated by the begin-
nings of a new research project, ‘Life, Death, Disability and the Human: Living 
Life to the Fullest’ (ES/P001041/1) funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council, and seeks to forge new understandings of the lives, hopes, desires and 
contributions of children and young people with ‘life-limiting’ or ‘life-threatening’ 
impairments (LL/LTIs). With children and young people as our co-researchers, the 
project will be a space where disabled children and young people can tell new 
stories of disability; their own stories.
There is something instantly emotive around the idea of a child or young per-
son living a short life. People are affected, often deeply, by the idea that a young 
person’s life course is reduced through the presence of impairment. We know that 
cultural and individual responses to young people with LL/LTIs are significantly 
shaped through a plethora of dominant ideas and practices linked to idealisations 
associated with quality of life, human productivity and lives lived well and long. 
Young people with LL/LTIs appear to be at odds with the neoliberal imperatives of 
self-sufficiency, autonomy and independence. Their presence makes society feel 
for their predicament. In this article, we seek to contest these dangerous discourses 
with reference to concepts emerging from the inter-disciplinary fields of affect 
theory and critical disability studies. Because our project is in the early stages of 
fruition and empirical work is yet to start, we use this article as an opportunity to 
pause and to consider possible connections between theories of affect and critical 
disability studies.
2. Introducing theories of affect
There will always be debates about the extent to which we can generalise an 
intellectual space that is fraught with debate, tension and disagreement. The 
study of affect broadly hails a return to emotion and feeling including (although 
not exclusively) happiness, love, optimism, misery, contentment, guilt, bitterness, 
envy, humiliation, fear, grief, disgust, passion, psychic pain, desire, hope, shame, 
anger, imagination and optimism. Gorton (2007) observes that distinctions are 
sometimes made between emotion (a sociological expression of feelings) and 
affect (a physical response rooted in biology). Such a simplistic distinction is now 
generally avoided and we use affect and emotion interchangeably in this article 
to acknowledge that biology and society are firmly wrapped up with one another. 
As Gorton (2007, 334) puts it, ‘feeling is negotiated in the public sphere and expe-
rienced through the body’.
It is a truism to suggest that we affect other people and are in turn affected by 
them. Yet the return to affect in social theory is a relatively new one, predicated 
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DISABILITY & SOCIETY  199
upon the idea that theorists have tended to sideline the emotional. Sociologists, 
for example, have always been preoccupied with discourse, culture and structure. 
These are, after all, some of the big-hitting leitmotifs of the discipline. A turn to 
affect asks us to consider those elements that have been ignored in favour of more 
public, measurable and structural indicators. Similarly, discursive psychologists 
have contested the individualisation of psychological ideas such as attitude, per-
sonality, resilience and emotion but have left the theoretical space with very little 
to say about the affective or the embodied. Emotions and embodied feelings need 
to be part of sociological and critical psychological thinking. The turn to affect is not 
simply about addressing a missing psycho-emotional dimension in social theory. 
Affect theory responds to the ways in which affects are mobilised by economic 
and cultural forces. Affect theories are interested in the ways in which contempo-
rary citizens are ‘thrown into a constellation of affections – which may have the 
quality of feeling necessary to our lives, but which may be both contingent and 
punitive’ (Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon 2014, 224). We come not only to know 
and perform ourselves (Butler 1999); we are also expected to know how to feel.
According to Wetherell (2015, 139), the humanities and psychological and social 
sciences are witnessing the emergence of various theories of affect that attend to 
the ways in ‘which bodies are pushed and pulled in contemporary social forma-
tions, in the “engineering” of affective responses, and in how workers and citizens 
become emotionally engaged and affectively interpellated’. In their special issue 
on affect in the journal Body & Society, Blackman and Venn (2010) draw attention 
to the ways in which affect is felt at the level of the body but is always socially and 
culturally conditioned. Affects are felt individually, materially and physiologically 
but are always being reproduced by their entanglements with the social world. 
In their special issue of Feminist Theory, Pedwell and Whitehead (2012) consider 
the relationship between affect and feminist theory. They note that affect studies 
constitute an interdisciplinary space with often contradictory and oppositional 
takes upon the subject matter. What is clear, following Gorton (2007, 334), is that 
there is shared interest in the way ‘feeling is negotiated in the public sphere and 
experienced in the body’. Foucault often figures in the bibliographies of affect 
theorists in the biopolitical constitution of the subject and subjectivity, and many 
authors share ‘a concern with how power circulates through feeling and how polit-
ically salient ways of being and knowing are produced through affective relations 
and discourses’ (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 116).
One of the most well-known affect writers, Ahmed (2004) is clear that we are 
subject to various affect economies in which bodies and emotions are shaped and 
stifled. We are increasingly witnessing an ‘emotionalisation of society’ (Pedwell and 
Whitehead 2012). Romantic love, for example, becomes known through dominant 
practices of Hollywood, psychotherapy and memes of social media. Nurture, affec-
tion and care are shaped through complex political, cultural and social economies. 
Think of the John Lewis (a UK department store) Christmas television adverts as 
explicit examples of the ways in which desire, care and family are played out – and 
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200   D. GOODLEY ET AL.
risk being prescribed – through the act of consumption.1 Dan (first author), at this 
juncture, feels it necessary to shamefully confess that every Christmas, no matter 
how Scrooge-like he is feeling, he finds himself in bits, sobbing before his kids, as 
they look on at him with disgust. What can we say? Dan’s a sucker for a bouncing 
dog, a lost snowman and a forlorn rabbit. As a key player in the affect economy, 
television is a successful exploiter of catchy emotions (Gorton 2007, 338); those 
feelings that spread contagiously through the workings of affect economies (and 
especially catchy in relationships of consumption). Ahmed’s work displays a cyn-
icism towards those social and cultural processes that threaten to affectively box 
people in: to become emotionally attached to particular kinds of object and sub-
jects in the social world. The feelings we hold and express can (re)produce dom-
inant social and geopolitical hierarchies and exclusions (Pedwell and Whitehead 
2012, 120). In this sense, then, affect is always relational: and these relationalities 
take place between humans and non-humans, bodies and culture, individuals and 
society, and organic entities and machines (Fox and Alldred 2015). How we come to 
feel or emote is the consequence of our relationship with others. We affect others 
and they affect us. This leads Wetherell (2015) to conclude that affect is always 
distributed: we feel and emote in the relationships we have others.
The affective turn is also associated with some moves to put the psyche into 
the social (hence the idea of the psychosocial in critical social psychology). But this 
does not necessarily mean reinserting a pre-social psyche. For instance, Blackman 
and Venn (2010, 20) are interested in the kinds of idealised images of the body that 
shape affects: ‘the kinds of fantasies and desires that might propel our investments, 
financial and corporeal with our bodies’. Affect is something that is performed 
and it is the idea of affective practice that Wetherell (2015) prefers over a choice 
of affect. Wetherell is a renowned discursive psychologist and so is interested in 
the ways in which discursive practices produce the effects of their actions. This 
understanding of affective practice resonates with the hugely influential work of 
Hochschild’s (1983) emotional labour. This concept seeks to account for the assault 
on the self that occurs in response to demanding publics. Emotions are corpo-
real thoughts, embodied processes, imbricated with social values and frequently 
involved in preserving social bonds, social rules and display of behaviour (Williams 
2003, 519–520). Hochschild’s concept of emotional labour refers to those times 
when the self acts in ways that fit the expectations of others. This sense of the 
affective register being laid out through complex social and cultural relationships 
invites in the work of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), not least in their idea of biopo-
litical citizenship and immaterial labour. As Goodley and Lawthom (2011, 118) 
have articulated, Hardt and Negri shine light on ‘the transformation of the labour 
process which has created a new proletariat through an emphasis on knowledge 
and affect (with the latter showing an increased weight of activities focused on 
health, education and social care) (Rustin, 2002)’. We are increasingly made to do 
work on ourselves – governance – and we do this through working the self and 
our relationships with others. This immaterial labour – knowledge, information, 
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DISABILITY & SOCIETY  201
communication and emotional reproduction – becomes the site through which we 
constitute our subjectivities, identities and ways of being with others. Increasingly, 
places that were formerly the remit of the private/personal (e.g. sexual relation-
ships, families, households) are increasingly governed by public interventions, 
which seek to normalise their practices and create ideal national citizens:
These areas of affective/emotional/immaterial labour – which include the service 
industry, health and social welfare services, caring and maternal work – know no hours 
of work (beyond the 9 to 5 working day), are always labouring and in the process of 
becoming experts about themselves. (Goodley and Lawthom 2011, 118)
This centralising of subjectivity in the constitution of self and society will be all too 
familiar to students of Foucault. In addition, Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) push 
this analysis further into a conceptualisation of affective labour as the labour of 
the postmodern proletariat caught up in the globalisation of an affect economy 
(or Empire as they term it; original emphases).
A turn to affect is also associated with a desire to recognise the materiality 
of the body – and the material relationships between human bodies and other 
non-human entities. This addresses the somatophobia that has been found in 
some transformative writings in queer, feminist and disability studies. This fear of 
the body can be traced back to the advent of these radical perspectives which, in 
part, politically responded to biological essentialism that viewed queer, disabled 
and female bodies as inherently abnormal. In contrast, recent theories of affect 
have focused on the extra-discursive. A common trope within the philosophy 
of materialism ultimately considers matter to be something that exists beyond 
human perception (Flynn 2017). Accepting the limits of discursive analysis has 
pushed many into what are now commonly known as new materialist theories 
(associated often with the appeal of writers such as Rosi Braidotti, Brian Massumi, 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari). Martin (2013) offers an anthropologist’s reading 
of the materialist affect theory literature. She notes, borrowing from the work of 
Leys (2011, 437), that, at various times, affects are considered to be:
‘inhuman,’ ‘pre-subjective,’ ‘visceral’ forces and intensities that influence our thinking and 
judgments but are separate from these. Whatever else may be meant by the terms affect 
and emotion … the affects must be non-cognitive, corporeal processes or states. (Martin 
2013, 465; original emphases)
Materialist affect theorists seek to tune into the human as a visceral, embodied, 
emotive and corporeal creature. Too often in social theory there is an emphasis 
on reason, rationality and the linguistic. A positive of such a reading of affect is 
that we recognise the pre-social potentiality of a living body. A negative reading 
of this is that we are straying into the dangerous theoretical lands of the pre-so-
cial biological: a terrain exploited by some forms of psychological individualism 
and essentialism (see Billington’s [2016] critique). We share Martin’s (2013, S156) 
concerns when she states: ‘we need to ask whether one result of seeing the affects 
as biological phenomena is losing the insights that feminism can provide’. A more 
positive reading of the material potentiality of the body is provided by Deleuze 
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202   D. GOODLEY ET AL.
and Guattari (1987) – who position the body as one full of affective potential yet 
to be coded and stifled by strict cultural codes. Affect, in this sense, is a ‘material 
intensity that emerges via the “in-between” spaces of embodied encounters, cir-
culating power not primarily as a mode of discursive regulation but rather as the 
potential to “become otherwise”’ (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 116). This vague 
language of DeleuzoGuattarian potentiality is given political purchase and con-
ceptual clarity through the hugely influential work of Braidotti (1994, 2002, 2003, 
2005, 2006, 2013). For example, her work on nomadic affectivity represents desire 
as outward bound and based on the human’s complex relations with a  multiplicity 
of others, including non-human others. This reorganisation of desire – from the 
psychoanalytic desire for the things we lack to a desire for connections anew 
with other humans and non-human beings – is explained in part through our 
deeply technologically embedded global world which blurs ‘fundamental cate-
gorical divides between self and other; a sort of heteroglossia of the species, a 
colossal hybridisation which combines cyborgs, monsters, insects and machines 
into a powerfully posthuman approach to what we used to call “the embodied 
subject”’ (Braidotti 2005, no page). Put simply, then, Braidotti asks us to reveal the 
connections between humans, other humans and non-humans because through 
these relationships we might find major rearticulations of affect, emotion and 
feeling. This is the brave new world of the posthuman: a space and time where we 
find ‘non-unitary, radically materialist and dynamic structure[s] of subjectivity … 
[expressing each] subject’s capacity for multiple, non-linear and outward-bound 
inter-connections with a number of external forces and others’ (Braidotti 2005, 
no page).
The human category of modern societies (especially in Western Europe and 
North America) has been one tied to the ethics and philosophy of humanism: 
a speaking subject, bounded and ordered, with clear distinctions of cognition/
affect, reason/passion, rationality/irrationality or self/other. The posthuman is a 
reaction and an alternative to humanism and its associated prescribed, bounded 
and self-governing sovereign self. Affect is released from its binarised and othered 
distinction (as the opposite of cognition) as the human category itself is opened 
up as a distributed entity more in keeping with our contemporary techno-cul-
ture. Affect is not to be found inside human beings, but in the connections and 
relationships between humans and non-humans. In her early writings, Braidotti 
(2005, no page) was keen to emphasise a number of ways in which the posthuman 
condition is created:
•  ‘Mutual inter-dependences and productive mergers of forces that give rise 
to creative becomings’ (here we like to think of the work of educational inclu-
sion done between and amongst a group of disabled and non-disabled chil-
dren in a classroom as they are assisted by a teacher and her assistants to 
work together as a group task).
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DISABILITY & SOCIETY  203
•  ‘Replacing the old subject formation with a notion of the subject as a cluster 
of complex and intensive forces – intensive assemblages which connect and 
inter-relate with others in a variety of ways’ (the disabled child is no longer a 
fixed subject but part of the assemblage already described). 
•  ‘An attack on identity. Not on any one identity, but on the very concept of 
identity’ (consider the ways in which a child is always becoming – never a 
fixed being – and use this same idea when thinking about humans more 
generally).
•  ‘Avoiding references to the paradigms of human nature (be it biological, 
psychic or genetic essentialism) while taking fully into account the fact that 
bodies have indeed become techno-cultural constructs immersed in net-
works of complex, simultaneous and potentially conflicting power-relations’ 
(it is no longer possible to talk of national boundaries, friendships or activist 
organisations in the same way as it was 20 years ago before the advent of 
social media).
•  ‘A non-unitary vision of the subject that endorses a radical ethics of trans-
formation, thus running against the grain of contemporary neo-liberal con-
servatism, but it also asserts an equally strong distance from relativism or 
nihilistic defeatism’ (a grounded sense of working together as an assem-
blage, impossible to pinpoint where the collective begins or ends, a celebra-
tion of many connection points, of numerous affective possibilities).
Braidotti writes that ‘a non-unitary subject proposes an enlarged sense of inter-con-
nection between self and others, including the non-human or “earth” others, by 
removing the obstacle of self-centred individualism’ (2005, no page). Our affects 
– and what we desire – are enacted through our mutual interdependencies and 
assemblages rather than as manifestations of inherent humanist emotions.
Fox and Alldred (2015) set up new materialist analyses as being interested in 
social production rather than social construction; especially in relational networks 
or assemblages of animate and inanimate entities. Materiality is plural, open, com-
plex, uneven and contingent especially if viewed from a DeleuzoGuattarian per-
spective (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Fox and Alldred 2015, 400). Hence:
•  Bodies are always relational as are other material, social and abstract entities 
with no distinct ontological status other than produced through their rela-
tionships or assemblages.
•  We replace the idea of human agency with the Spinozist notion of affect: 
meaning simply the capacity to affect or be affected. So affects are always 
becoming and this refers to a change in the capacities of state of an entity.
•  We attend to the production of assemblages, which are constantly becom-
ing as they territorialise (stabilising an assemblage) or de-territorialising 
(destabilising an assemblage) (Fox and Alldred 2015, 401).
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204   D. GOODLEY ET AL.
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest that we map the assemblage and find gaps 
between its rigid lines that offer lines of flight and the emergence of smooth 
spaces (for moments of de-territorialisation). As Youdell and Armstrong (2011, 
145) put it:
Striated space can be thought about as the binary, hierarchical, and normative mean-
ings of spaces and their possibilities and impossibilities … Striations are the deep scores 
or grooves cut by the rigid lines of the assemblage, defining and constraining meaning 
and practice. The smooth spaces against which these are contrasted are not distinct 
spaces, but are moments and sites of possibility when and where the assemblage and its 
striations might be disrupted or deterritorialized … A line of flight might allow us to trip 
out of the striations in which we are caught to skate on the smooth plateaus between, 
even if in doing so we slip into or begin to grind out yet another striation.
Smooth spaces are associated, then, with de-territorialising over-coded striated 
assemblages. Youdell and Armstrong (2011) encourage us to think about school. 
Consider the over-coding or the striations of schools. Note those un/written rules 
that pervade. Think too how in these school assemblages children are sifted, 
selected and coded in affirmative ways (gifted and talented) or, in other cases, 
coded in limiting ways (Special Educational Needs and Disabilities). We will return 
to materialist analyses of affect later.
The rise of emotion and feeling is also having huge impacts on the human and 
psychological sciences, specifically neuropsychology. Billington (2017), for exam-
ple, draws in the work of the critical neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, whose focus 
on affect, feeling and emotion has not only expanded conceptualisations of the 
cognitive to include emotion but also emphasised the impact of the environment 
on the brain. Billington (2017, 5) insists that these new affective neuroscientists 
are interested not in the minute detail of neurons firing but in ‘lifting /the neuro-
logical or psychological veil to reveal the latest political challenge posed to social 
and education inclusion’. Here Billington’s work is closely aligned to the work of 
Ahmed and others who are interested in moving beyond ‘the “inside out” model 
of psychology, and the “outside in” model proffered by sociology and anthropol-
ogy’ (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 123). Affect is necessarily complicating, then, 
because it seeks to challenge these well-worn distinctions between interior and 
exterior worlds. How we feel is closely connected to our place in the world and 
many theorists of affect want to keep this dynamic relationship between self/other, 
body/society and psyche/culture, developing new vocabularies for understanding 
these complexes.
Thus far, in this article, we have considered some of the theoretical considera-
tions and analytical trajectories within the field of affect studies. Our sense is that 
much is to be gained by critical disability studies engaging with this work and this 
is especially the case from our perspective as we start a new research project that 
works alongside young people with LL/LTIs and their families.
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DISABILITY & SOCIETY  205
3. Sparking our interest in affect: our study
Our interest in theories of affect has been generated by the beginnings of a new 
research project. We can gauge the values of any society by considering how it 
treats those people who are the most marginalised. Too often disabled young 
people find themselves on the outskirts of society. This is especially the case for 
one group of disabled young people. We know much about the deaths of young 
people with life-limiting or life-threatening impairments (LL/LTIs) but relatively 
little about their lived lives. This invisibility could be detrimental to their social 
and emotional well-being and mental health, and that of their families/carers and 
allies. Our research seeks to forge new understandings of the lives, hopes, desires 
and contributions of disabled young people with LL/LTIs. This will permit us to 
think differently about how society understands life and death, and will deliver 
forms of co-produced knowledge that will be useful to academics and to a host of 
civil society organisations, professionals and communities that are also seeking to 
value short lives and respect death as part of the human condition. Our inquiry is 
a flagship project of the Institute for the Study of the Human at the University of 
Sheffield.2 The project began in April 2017 and finishes in April 2020.
According to the national charity Together for Short Lives, LL/LTIs considerably 
shorten children and young people’s life expectancy. There are around 49,000 
children and young people with LL/LTIs in the United Kingdom, and these rates 
are increasing year on year. Young people with LL/LTIs are living longer than ever 
before, yet we know little of their lives, particularly from their own perspectives. 
This lack of knowledge is due to the marked absences of this unique group of 
disabled young people from public imagination and broader culture. Young peo-
ple with LL/LTIs have been omitted from much academic research; are seldom 
explicitly written into public policy; are often excluded from disability communi-
ties and disabled people’s own movements; and have their voices dominated by 
professional perspectives within palliative (end-of-life) care teaching, education 
and training (see Runswick-Cole, Curran, and Liddiard, 2017). Whilst there has been 
work in the palliative, nursing and medical worlds on LL/LTIs, very little of this work 
has included or speaks from young people’s own perspectives. Consequently, crit-
ical questions subsist around personal, relational and collective well-being. This 
project is timely given that our previous research showed that disabled young 
people and their families/carers and allies experience significant exclusion and 
discrimination; exclusion which is currently exacerbated through severe aus-
terity in the United Kingdom. Therefore, with young people alongside us as our 
co-researchers, and working in partnership with leading disability/LL/LTI organi-
sations (Purple Patch Arts, DMD Pathfinders, Good Things Foundation, Muscular 
Dystrophy UK Trailblazers), we will explore the lives of young people with LL/LTIs 
as they experience and understand them, with the aim of making their lives visible. 
Young people with LL/LTIs and their families will tell their own stories through 
multi-modal engagement with innovative art-making and narrative approaches. 
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206   D. GOODLEY ET AL.
Working with our Community Research Partners and Expert Impact Partners we are 
co-designing impact activities which ensure that research findings are applied and 
utilised in real-life settings and thus are relevant, transferable, accessible and trans-
formative outside academia. We propose that this impact serves to improve the 
social, emotional and mental health and well-being of young people with LL/LTIs, 
and their parents/carers and wider families, and other members of their networks 
who make up the constantly shifting assemblages within which they intra-act 
and affect one another, enabling them to live life to the fullest. More information 
on the project – including the specificities of methodology and method – can be 
found at the project website.3
Because our study is in its infancy we are starting to collect our empirical data. 
However, we know that researchers never enter a project value-free or theoretically 
and conceptually under-developed. In contrast, we hold the firm conviction that 
researchers should always be mindful of the kinds of theoretical understandings 
that they hold and the potential ways in which these theories might conceptual-
ise their subject matter. Our commitment to working collaboratively with young 
people with LL/LTIs extends to our choice of theory. We seek theory that connects 
with the lifeworld of these young people. More generally, we will explore how the 
theoretical lexicons of affect and disability can be plundered in order to help us 
understand disability in the world.
4. Feeling disability
Disability can and should be an entry point into studies of affect. We might want to 
think about the ways in which affect economies draw disabled people and those 
close to them into particular ways of feeling and emoting. Like Ahmed (2004) and 
Pedwell and Whitehead (2012) we are wary of those affect theorists who claim 
that their work constitutes a brand-new field on inquiry in relation to emotion 
and feeling. Just as feminism can claim a long historical alignment with affect 
through ‘the personal is political’, so critical disability studies can also point to a 
body of literature that has been engaged with the affective experiences of dis-
ability (Goodley 2016). Critical disability studies is a nascent field of scholarship 
and activism that explicitly engages with transformative fields of inquiry including 
queer, postcolonial, indigenous and feminist studies. Theories of affect sit at the 
intersections of these different spaces of theorisation. In the following, we make 
some novel connections of theoretical orientations and trajectories from affect 
theory and critical disability studies.
4.1. Ontological invalidation in neoliberal-able times
How come you are in a wheelchair?
What happened to you then?
I never think of you as disabled?
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You are so brave, you know. (Common comments and questions made by non-disabled 
people to disabled people; see Goodley 2016). It must be so difficult for you, having a 
disabled child, but it’s a good job it happened to you, I don’t think I could cope. (Personal 
comment made to one of the authors, no date)
A lot of people [friends] will ask, ‘Does Shaun’s willy work?’ (Hannah, non-disabled wife 
of Shaun, a man with Spinal Cord Injury [SCI]; see Liddiard 2017)
The British feminist disability scholars Thomas (1999, 2001, 2002, 2007) and Reeve 
(2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) have created a theoretical space for thinking 
creatively about the psyche. As Goodley (2016) argues, both are sceptical about 
psychologisation but share an interest in what Reeve describes as the ‘barriers 
in here’ that are often ignored by radical structuralist sociologists who are more 
focused on the ‘barriers out there’ (2008, 1). The psycho-emotional register is pro-
gressive because it seeks to consider what ‘disabled people can be’ rather than 
what ‘disabled people can do’. But this approach is also sensitised to an exploration 
of indirect and direct forms of psycho-emotional disablism.4 Direct forms can be 
found in discriminatory interactions, acts of invalidation, patronising responses 
of others and hate crimes such as the destruction of group symbols and hate lit-
erature (Sherry 2000). Indirect forms of psycho-emotional disablism are less overt 
but just as damaging. They may emerge as side effects of structural disablism 
(a feeling of dislocation in a building that is largely inaccessible) or unintended 
actions, words or deeds (such as stares of curious others, patronising attitudes, 
need-freak requests for assistance) (see Liddiard 2014).
How are disabled people, their partners, families and allies meant to respond 
emotionally to these questions? By accommodating non-disabled people, perhaps 
offering a smile, a short answer and a response that will not make the non-disabled 
person even more uncomfortable. Anger, violence or rejection on the part of the 
disabled person would no doubt be understood by the non-disabled inquisitor as 
a rude emotional response of someone with a ‘chip on their shoulder’. Ironically, it 
would at the same time serve to embody the stale ableist trope of the angry, bitter 
crip. Liddiard (2014, 124) recognises both the complex management of feeling 
and the relational politics inherent to responding in the right ways as forms of 
skilled emotional labour, as disabled people come to take on the diverse roles of 
teacher, negotiator, manager, mediator, performer and educator’ in negotiating 
their reactions and responses – enacting forms of skilled inter-personal labour 
desired by the very western labour markets from which they are largely excluded 
(see Exley and Letherby 2001). Hochschild (1983) is clear: there are appropriate 
affects to display in these moments of interaction. Families with disabled children 
and disabled children themselves have described the affective labour that they are 
forced to engage with to manage the emotions of others (Runswick-Cole 2013). 
Disabled people have articulated the emotional work and labour required within 
their loving and sexual relationships with close others, showing that such labour 
can reach the most intimate spaces of life and self (Liddiard 2014).
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In our respective work, each of us has previously drawn on Hochschild’s work to 
explain the ways in which disabled people engage in disabling forms of emotional 
labour (Goodley 2016; Liddiard 2014; Runswick-Cole 2010, 2013); as disabled peo-
ple, their partners and their families find themselves caught up in interactions with 
non-disabled people that are governed by a number of well-known social scripts 
(Goodley 2016; Runswick-Cole 2013). These scripts invite non-disabled people 
to interact with disability that permits, for example, the asking of inappropriate, 
demeaning and highly personalised questions and commentaries we outlined at 
the start of this section.
Affect is deeply embedded in cultural norms. Hughes (2009, 2012, 2015) points 
out that disabled people are associated with a cultural history of disgust, pity and 
fear. This renders disabled people as objects of ambivalent feelings from wider 
non-disabled society such as resentment and hatred. Disabled people risk being 
ontologically invalidated by the disabling worlds that they inhabit. Hughes (2009, 
408) argues that:
The role of fear … is hugely underplayed in personal tragedy theory. So to is the role of 
disgust, a mediating emotion in the relations between disabled and nondisabled peo-
ple that is in need of considerable development.
Hughes’ work builds sociologically on the psychological and psychoanalytic anal-
ysis of Marks (1999a, 1999b, 2002) that sought to probe unconscious responses to 
disability. Marks powerfully argued that being subjected to the damaging pathol-
ogising projections of others risked being internalised by disabled people:
where the projections of societal norms of dependency and bodily imperfection are 
internalised, only to sit ambivalently, often shamefully, with one’s psychical position in a 
disabling world. (Marks 1999a; 21)
Such feelings of emotional and ontological invalidation risk self-harm and self-ha-
tred (Marks 1999b, 615, also see Hughes 2009). Goodley too has deployed social 
psychoanalytic concepts to explain further the generation of fear, disgust but also 
attraction in relation to disability displayed by non-disabled culture (Goodley 2011, 
2014, 2016). This analysis was indebted to the writings of Marks (1999a, 1999b, 
2002) and Watermeyer (2013) who as therapists trained in the psychoanalytic tra-
dition are far more skilled in deploying this theoretical language. Both were keen 
to understand the ontological damage done to disabled people whilst living in 
a society that veers from not recognising disabled people as valued members 
of society to conceptualising disability solely in terms of deficit and lack. Marks 
and Watermeyer are keen to take seriously the emotional lives of disabled peo-
ple and do so with a keen interest in the socio-cultural conditions in which one’s 
psycho-emotional life thrives or fails.
Clearly, living in such a dismissive atmosphere risks causing feelings of invalida-
tion. Also, we know that a precarious sense of self becomes heightened in times of 
austerity (Flynn 2017). Goodley’s (2011, 2016) interest in deploying psychoanalysis 
was less with disabled people and more with non-disabled people. In particular, he 
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played around with the idea of the psychopathology of the normals, which con-
siders the ways in which the precarious nature of living with being non-disabled 
(or able-bodied or able-minded) inevitably plunges individuals into emotional 
turmoil (Goodley 2014). One easy route out of any psychic trouble is projection: 
finding failings in others. We therefore might understand feelings of disgust or 
fear (or attraction for that matter) as symptoms of the underlying neurosis on the 
part of non-disabled people. Hence, disability becomes disavowed by norma-
tive culture: it is rejected (because it symbolises lack) and adored (because of its 
association with dependency which is the human condition desired by most of 
us caught in the terrors of adult autonomy). While some affect theorists consider 
the field to be in part a rejection of the psychoanalytic ownership of the affective 
register, psychoanalysis may be critically reappropriated to make sense of wider 
cultural formations of emotion. Indeed, Gorton (2008) and Duschinsky, Greco, 
and Solomon (2014) draw on related concepts of attachment and fantasy in their 
interrogation of affective culture. Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon (2014, 232) 
note that the idea of attachment might well be the best way to engage with a 
vital question left behind by Foucault: why we emotionally invest in the cultures 
and institutions which discipline our identities and limit our potential to flourish. 
For Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon (2014) this is the root of Berlant’s affective 
notion of cruel optimism: ‘an optimistic attachment is cruel when the object/scene 
of desire is itself an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants that bring people to it: 
but its life-organising status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes’ 
(Berlant 2011, 227). The consequence of such cruel optimism risks causing emo-
tional distress, as one fails to match up to the labour and consumption demands 
of late capitalism. One route out of such distress is to unconsciously view and 
locate failure in others. This might help us explain the cultural disavowal of young 
people with LL/LTIs and their families.
We might understand the broader cultural politics of emotion or affect economy 
(Ahmed 2004) – against which interactions such as those already described take 
place – as one being framed by ableism (Campbell 2009; Goodley 2014). Ableism 
is associated with the broader cultural logics of autonomy, self-sufficiency and 
independence. These logics are unquestionably and uncritically linked to psycho-
logical contentment and the affect of happiness. Ahmed ([2007] 2008) urges us 
to shake up our taken-for-granted ideas around happiness. Indeed, her critique 
of the pursuit of happiness, which is promulgated by psychological therapies and 
the self-help industry, fits well with a critical disability studies rejection of neoliber-
al-ableism. The latter discourse similarly propels the individual citizen towards an 
end of point of supposed contentment through the never-ending performances 
of labour and consumption. Happiness is to be bought, and so is able-bodied and 
able-mindedness. Here we can see further connections with Berlant’s (2007, 2010, 
2011) cruel optimism: the mistaken desire and belief that we will reach personal 
fulfilment and happiness through working and shopping hard enough. Happiness, 
for Ahmed ([2007] 2008), can be understood as a promise or aspiration, a habit, a 
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narrative, a memory, as well as an emotion, feeling or affect.5 We would want to 
consider ability (and the desire of autonomy tied up within ableism) in similar ways. 
Neoliberal-ableism is the elision of individual and national economic independ-
ence with an individual and cultural celebration of autonomy (Goodley 2014). This 
particular cultural economy ties individual and national progress to independence 
and, by virtue of this, associates happiness with self-sufficiency. Young people 
with LL/LTIs risk being threatened with what Flynn (2017, 155) describes as a ‘lived 
experience of shock and disappointment’ that can further devalue their identities 
as young disabled people. We would want to understand and contest the affective 
consequences of neoliberal-ableism.
4.2. Affect aliens and crip killjoys
About 4 years ago we submitted a research project application to work with young dis-
abled people with life limiting impairments. Eventually we got back the reviewers’ com-
ments. Of the six, four were glowing, one lukewarm and the final one dismissive. Project 
funding was rejected. Our most critical reviewer wrote ‘While I accept the research team 
want to work with disabled young people, the focus on life-threatening impairments 
runs the risk of re-energising the personal tragedy model of disability: a perspective that 
disabled people and their organisations have been trying to distance themselves from 
for a number of years’. (Personal anecdote, name withheld)
So far, our discussion has outlined a rather top-down affair in relation to the cultural 
reproduction of affect. Ahmed (2010) offers a more resistant politic. Ahmed has 
happiness as her target when she writes that ‘the feminist killjoy spoils the happi-
ness of others; she is a spoilsport because she refuses to convene, to assemble, or 
to meet up over happiness’. She is interested in critiquing happiness as the affect 
reproduced by a capitalist society:
Does the feminist kill other people’s joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does 
she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs 
of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things? 
Or does the entry of anger simply mean that the bad feelings that circulate through 
objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist subject in the room 
hence brings others down, not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism 
but by exposing how happiness is sustained, by erasing the signs of not getting along. 
Feminists do kill joy in a certain sense: they disturb the very fantasy that happiness can 
be found in certain places. To kill a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that femi-
nists might not be happily affected by the objects that are supposed to cause happiness 
but that the failure to be happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others. Feminists 
might be strangers at the table of happiness. (Ahmed 2010, 582)
She goes on:
I want to think of consciousness of the un in unhappy as consciousness of being not. 
Consciousness of being not or un can be consciousness of being already estranged from 
happiness, of lacking the qualities or attributes required for a happy state of existence. 
To be not happy is to be not in the eyes of others, in the world of whiteness, which is the 
world as it coheres around right bodies, or the white bodies. Consciousness of being not 
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involves self-consciousness; you recognize yourself as the stranger. (Ahmed 2010, 589; 
original emphases)
We can draw parallels with crip politics here. Johnson and McRuer (2014) and 
Tsakiri (2016) extend the idea of the crip killjoy who resists imposed positionings 
by normative society. Disabled people are similarly strangers at the neoliberal-able 
table that only recognises self-sufficiency. To Ahmed’s ‘un’ and ‘not’ we can add ‘dis’. 
To be or become disabled is to work against a normative ableist culture that pur-
sues its own happiness through a celebration of individuated autonomy. ‘There is 
solidarity in recognizing our alienation from happiness’, Ahmed (2010, 592) argues, 
‘even if we do not inhabit the same place (and we do not). There can be joy in killing 
joy. And kill joy we must, and we do’. We might think of rephrasing this affective 
politics thus: ‘there can be joy in dissing ability. And dis ability we must, and we 
do’. We might view young people with LL/LTIs as unintentionally occupying the 
position of crip killjoys because their shortened lives and limited or life-threatening 
impairments sit in stark contrast to the ableist ideals of contemporary life. Indeed, 
even in the potentially more liberating contexts of the disabled people’s move-
ment, normative ideas about valued lives have been articulated. The ‘Not Dead 
Yet’ slogan from the United States seeks to distinguish between the pride one has 
in a disabled life contrasted with the finality and tragedy of death. Young people 
with LL/LTIs subvert this affective logic. They appear as what we might term affect 
aliens: alienated by the ableist logics of living a standard life and, importantly, 
alienating others by their presence. The shame associated with this disability–life–
death complex rears itself not in young people with LL/LTIs but in relation to those 
(disabled) people who unknowingly maintain a dangerous simplistic distinction 
between a standardised split of life and death.
4.3. Disability and resistant assemblages
At a recent university event showcasing robotics and human enhancement research, 
a group of young disabled people who are also users of Alternative and Augmentative 
Communication (AAC) were preparing for their presentation. During conversations 
with the organising team of the university, one of the young people explained that 
she worked closely with her family, personal assistants and technology professionals 
to ensure that the AAC provided bespoke language and favoured sayings. Using the 
hardware to tell her older brother to ‘fuck off’ was a key element of these discussions. 
(Dan Goodley, personal anecdote, November 2014, somewhere in the United Kingdom)
Braidotti’s (2005, no page) brand of affect theory is associated with a ‘nomadic 
affectivity’; an outward bound perspective based on complex relations with a mul-
tiplicity of others, ‘including non human others’. This perspective seeks to under-
stand affect, body and the environment as intimately connected and materialised 
phenomena; raising questions about how we might relate to one another in dif-
ferent ways. According to Feely (2016, 868), Braidotti’s work has been crucial to 
the ‘ontological turn’ within continental philosophy which has brought forth ‘the 
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emergence of new ontologies and methodologies, which seek to explore both the 
material and semiotic forces which make up reality, without a return to essential-
ism’. This ontological turn has invited in new materialist analyses, thus offering us 
a way out of the critical realist versus poststructuralism debate that plagues criti-
cal disability studies. Critical realists such as Shakespeare (2014) and Vehmas and 
Watson (2014) lambast poststructuralist leanings within critical disability studies 
for ignoring the stark realities of impairment. However, for Feely (2016), the self-de-
fined ‘critical realism’ of these scholars actually lacks criticality because it imports 
simplistic essentialist ideas of impairment and the body. These interventions, he 
suggests, lack a more nuanced and dynamic engagement with the materiality of 
life. For Feely (2016) such an engagement is offered through bringing in the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari (for example, Deleuze and Guattari 1987) and to this we 
would add Deleuzian scholars, in particular the work of Braidotti (for example, 
Braidotti 2003, 2013). In Feely’s (2016) beautifully accessible piece he notes that for 
Deleuze reality is made up of discursive statements and material entities. Both are 
active, mutually affecting and have effects in the world (Feely 2016, 869). Deleuze’s 
materialism, indebted to Spinoza:
allows us to think and speak about bodies (or any entities). However, it insists that we 
reject the traditional preoccupation with essentialist questions (‘What is a body?’) and 
focus instead on its currently actualised, or what Deleuze calls actual, capacities (‘What 
can a body do?’) as well as its potential, or what Deleuze terms virtual, capacities (‘What 
else could a body do?’). (Feely 2016, 870)
A body’s capacities – the things it can and cannot do – are always contextual and 
relational (think technology, material resources, communities of support). Within 
Deleuzian terminology, when a body is ascribed one of these identities (e.g. ‘a 
person with a profound intellectual disability’), it is ‘over-coded’ and this prevents 
us from thinking creatively about the infinite number of things this body can or 
could do in different contexts (Feely 2016, 872). Embodied affects (e.g. joy) and 
visceral sensations (e.g. pain) can profoundly affect the discursive thoughts a body 
has and the words it speaks. At the same time, discursive thoughts or statements 
can trigger embodied affects and emotions.
Hence, for Feely (2016) the body is a ceaselessly becoming-body in a dynamic 
relationship with the environment. In order to understand the complex relation-
ships we need to turn outwards to consider the relation of the body with other 
embodied and non-embodied entities. We need to explore assemblages.
Attending to the extension of the disabled body through connections with 
other humans and non-humans produces a number of affective realisations. Let us 
pick out three (see Goodley, Lawthom, and Runswick-Cole [2014] for elaboration). 
First, disability is affirmed as the subjective and embodied position that reaches 
out for connection with others. Disability is necessarily affective: it has the poten-
tial to affect and be affected (Fox and Alldred (2015). Second, the human subject 
is exploded, shifting us from a preoccupation with the original humanistic fixed 
subject position (disabled person) to a recognition of the distributed machinic 
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assemblage of humans and non-humans (a posthuman complex). The affective 
moment is found in the complex merging of wet and hardware and human rela-
tionships. Third, disability is both centralised and decentralised. Disability is centred 
when it calls for assemblages and connections with others. Disability demands 
interdependency. As the assemblage grows, so disability loses its importance: it 
becomes decentred. The flows of connections and networks erase the original 
disability subject and replace it with a complex rhizomatic web of relationships. The 
AAC user is both a proud disabled person and a merging of organic and inorganic 
matter: a posthuman subject. The bodies and selves of young people with LL/LTIs 
are maintained through their complex integration in and through multiple tech-
nologies, caring practices and intimate labours (intimate assemblages), medical 
intervention and knowledges.
5. Conclusions
In this article, we have introduced a number of theoretical developments of affect 
theory. We have considered the extent to which some of these concepts might 
connect with disability; specifically through considering the lives of young peo-
ple with LL/LTIs and their families. While our research project is in its infancy, our 
analysis suggests that young people so labelled are subjected to a whole host of 
emotional responses that say more about the precarious affective state of dom-
inant culture. Critical disability studies must challenge cultural norms that risk 
further pathologising disabled people. The affective register is always a cultural 
and embodied register and it is here we might find moments of resistance as 
young people connect with others to contest normative ideas that assume their 
incompetence and emotional immaturity. New affective relationalities are made 
possible through disability’s hybridisation of human and non-humans.
These dalliances with feeling disability raise some significant questions about 
the future direction of critical disability studies. We have chosen three to conclude 
this article. First, we wonder whether there is a place for the humanist human in 
theorising when affect studies trouble individualised and interiorised versions 
of emotion. Do we want to have any relationship with traditional sciences of the 
individual such as psychology and psychoanalysis when these very sciences have 
contributed, in part, to the pathologisation of disability? What becomes of human 
rights if we give up on humanism? Second, should disability studies have any 
interest in subjectivity especially when the personhoods of disabled people have 
been historically marginalised? Our review of affect theory finds subjectivity to be 
understood as an old-fashioned term but we recognise that it holds theoretical pur-
chase in critical disability studies especially when thinking through the emotional 
impacts of oppression. For this reason we are loathe to discard it. Third, how might 
disability be pushed into the foreground of contemplations about the contempo-
rary reproduction of affect? For example, when new materialist theories distribute 
affect across assembled relationships of humans and non-humans then they have 
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the potential to connect disability studies with Science and Technology Studies. 
Too often, however, disability is configured as an object or product of science and 
technology rather than the starting subject for debate (Goodley, Lawthom, and 
Runswick-Cole 2014). Our ambition would be for disability to provoke analysis of 
human affect in a time of turbulent economic, technological and political change.
Notes
1.  For examples of these Christmas television adverts, see 2016, Accessed June 1, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sr6lr_VRsEo; 2015, https://www.theguardian.
com/media/video/2015/nov/06/john-lewis-debuts-2015-christmas-advert-
manonthemoon-video; 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/business/video/2014/
nov/06/monty-penguin-john-lewis-christmas-advert-video; and 2013, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=NW2EmATcb6o.
2.  See www.shef.ac.uk/ihuman.
3.  See Accessed June 1, 2017. https://livinglifetothefullest.org/.
4.  A point developed by Reeve and also by Carol Thomas (2007, 72).
5.  ‘Some things become good, or acquire their value as goods, insofar as they point 
toward happiness. They become happiness pointers, as if to follow their point would 
be to find happiness … Happiness does not reside in objects; it is promised through 
proximity to certain objects. The promise of happiness takes this form: if you do this or 
if you have that, then happiness is what follows’ (Ahmed 2010, 576).
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